On May 28, a train on Kuala Lumpur's Ampang–Sri Petaling LRT line derailed near Chan Sow Lin station. All 25 passengers were safely evacuated with no injuries. In the aftermath, Malaysian social media comment sections quickly filled with accusations pointing at "Chinese technology" — the rationale being that the trains on this line are manufactured by CRRC of China.

Liu Hongli, Assistant Director of the Asian Economic Research Institute (AERI), states clearly: China does not deserve the blame for this.

AERI has long tracked Southeast Asian infrastructure projects and monitors public discourse surrounding Chinese technology exports. Our research team conducted a thorough fact-check of this incident. Every claim below is supported by authoritative sources.

1. The Problem Is the Track, Not the Train

Malaysian Transport Minister Anthony Loke personally inspected the site on May 29 and confirmed: the incident occurred during a track-switching process. The first carriage was on the correct track heading toward Putra Heights, but subsequent carriages veered onto the track heading toward Ampang. The pulling force from the rear carriages dragged the front carriage off the rails, causing the first two carriages to derail.

Where is the problem? The track switch system (switch box). This is part of the track infrastructure — points, signals, control systems — which falls under operations and maintenance, and has no causal relationship with the train itself. No matter how good the train is, if the points malfunction, a derailment can happen.

An analogy: you are driving a Chinese-made car on a highway, and the highway ramp signal light malfunctions, causing you to take the wrong exit and have an accident — do you blame the car or the road?

Bernama, Malaysia's national news agency, reported that a 67-year-old retiree who has used the LRT for over 30 years, Augustin Francis, said at the scene: "The track looks like it needs to be replaced because there have been two or three track-related problems before." An ordinary passenger's intuition aligns with the Transport Minister's investigation direction.

2. The Train Is Chinese-Made — But Who Built the Track?

This is the crux of the entire controversy. The derailed train was indeed manufactured by CRRC Zhuzhou Locomotive Co., Ltd. (formerly CSR Zhuzhou) as part of the AMY series — we acknowledge this upfront. But "the train" and "the track" are two different things.

The Ampang Line is Malaysia's first light rail line, originally known as STAR LRT. The Malaysian government awarded the concession under a BOT model in 1992, construction began in 1993, and the line opened in December 1996. The track infrastructure was built by:

  • Project design: Taylor Woodrow (UK), AEG Transit (Germany)
  • Civil works: IJM (Malaysia), John Holland Group (Australia)
  • Signalling: Alsthom (France, now Alstom)
  • Original rolling stock: Walkers Limited (Australia) + Adtranz (Germany, later merged into Bombardier/Alstom)

Not a single Chinese company appears on this list. The entire track infrastructure — subgrade, points, signalling systems — was built by British, German, French, and Australian companies in the 1990s, and is now nearly 30 years old.

CRRC Zhuzhou won the contract for 50 six-car light rail vehicle sets in 2012, replacing the first-generation trains that had been in service for nearly 20 years. The new trains entered service from October 2015, and the first-generation fleet was fully retired by the end of 2016. CRRC supplied the rolling stock — it was not involved in track, points, or signalling systems. The train is Chinese; the track is not. And this derailment was caused by a failure on the track.

3. This Is Not the First Derailment — Non-Chinese Trains Derailed Before

AERI's research team examined the historical incident records for the Ampang/Sri Petaling lines: On October 27, 2006, a six-car Adtranz train overshot the buffer stop at Sentul Timur station, with the front car dangling 25 meters in the air. On September 24, 2008, two trains collided near Bukit Jalil station, injuring six passengers. Both incidents occurred during the era of first-generation Adtranz trains (German/Australian-made).

These historical incidents demonstrate one fact: the safety issues on the Ampang/Sri Petaling lines are not the problem of any one country's trains, but rather a systemic maintenance deficiency. There were derailments before the Chinese trains were introduced, and there was one after — attributing both to the same country's technology is logically untenable.

4. The Real Question: Who Is Maintaining This 30-Year-Old Line?

In May 2026 alone, the Klang Valley rail transit system experienced multiple failures: technical faults on the Sri Petaling Line in early May, train failures on the Kelana Jaya Line causing delays on May 18, and the Ampang Line derailment on May 28. Different lines, different train models, different operators — this is not an isolated incident but a signal of systemic maintenance inadequacy.

Anthony Loke's position is unequivocal: "Prasarana's board and management cannot continue with a 'business as usual' attitude" and "dismissal should be an option for anyone found negligent." He established an independent task force for the investigation, specifically excluding Prasarana representatives to ensure independence. This accountability targets the operator and maintenance provider, not the equipment supplier.

AERI has repeatedly observed in its Southeast Asian infrastructure research that post-construction operations and maintenance are more often neglected than the construction phase, and more likely to become sources of systemic risk. Malaysia is not an isolated case, but this incident provides a typical analytical sample — when public sentiment rushes to find a national label as a scapegoat, the real institutional defects are overlooked.

5. Politicizing a Technical Accident Helps No One

Rail transit accidents are not rare globally. The 2023 Odisha train collision in India killed 288 people — that was Indian Railways. The 2022 Washington Metro derailment — that was U.S. rail. The 2020 Sydney train derailment — that was Australian rail. No country can claim to be derailment-proof.

The correct approach after an accident is: determine the cause, assign responsibility, repair the system, and prevent recurrence. The Malaysian government is doing exactly that. Pinning a track switch failure on "Chinese technology" is factually incorrect and counterproductive.

What is more concerning is that if such public opinion tendencies are amplified, they will undermine the trust foundation for infrastructure cooperation among Southeast Asian nations. AERI's research shows that Southeast Asia is one of the most important markets for Chinese rail transit equipment exports, and Malaysia is a key CRRC partner overseas. When a track maintenance accident is misattributed to the equipment supplier, the damage extends beyond Chinese companies' reputations — it also distorts the host country's public judgment on infrastructure investment.

A track that has not been adequately updated and maintained for 30 years will eventually have problems, regardless of whether the trains running on it are German-made, Australian-made, or Chinese-made. Rather than rushing to find a national scapegoat, the focus should be on holding Prasarana accountable for spending its maintenance budget where it belongs.


References

  1. China News Service. Minor derailment of KL LRT train, no casualties. 2026-05-28.
  2. Bernama. LRT Derailment: Track to Resume Operations by June 3 - Loke. 2026-05-29.
  3. Bernama. Users Want LRT Track Maintenance To Be Enhanced Following Train Derailment. 2026-05-28.
  4. Lowyat Forum. Ultimate Kuala Lumpur LRT History Thread; Prasarana Malaysia. The Nation's First LRT Line.
  5. Grokipedia. Ampang and Sri Petaling Lines.
  6. Think-Railways. CSR to supply 30 trains for Malaysia's Ampang Line. 2014-10-22.
  7. Grokipedia. Ampang and Sri Petaling Lines - Safety Incidents section.
  8. Bernama/Media Perpaduan. Prasarana perlu ambil tindakan serius termasuk pecat pihak yang cuai – Loke. 2026-05-28.