Why Did Maserati Hand Its Soul to Huawei? China Technology Reverse Export and the Restructuring of the Global Luxury Car Value Chain

Asia Economic Research Institute (AERI)

Abstract

In May 2026, Huawei Harmony Intelligent Mobility Alliance (HIMA), JAC Motors, Stellantis, and Maserati were reported to be in deep negotiations to jointly develop a luxury new energy vehicle. Huawei leads product definition and provides full-stack intelligent technology, JAC handles manufacturing, and Maserati contributes only design and brand licensing. The boldest move? A "dual-badge" strategy—Maextro badge in China, Trident badge overseas. Let's be blunt: a century-old Italian luxury brand now relies on Chinese technology to survive; a Chinese tech company uses the Trident as a passport to go global. But is this really so shocking? Maserati's "soul" has never been entirely its own.

I. The Four-Way Game: Who Brings What, Who Wants What

Huawei is not a supplier—it dictates model positioning, feature architecture, and pricing strategy. Maserati? Downgraded from automaker to "design studio + badge licensor."

The dual-badge strategy is essentially brand arbitrage: domestically, Huawei's tech brand is already formidable (Maextro S800 averages CNY 700K–1M, delivered 16,000 units in 10 months of 2025, best-seller above CNY 700K); overseas, the Trident's appeal is something no Chinese automaker could buy with money, but its intelligent technology is embarrassingly outdated—Huawei fills that gap, and the product instantly becomes competitive.

The first model is in the styling design phase, planned for mass production in H2 2027. The October 2026 Paris Motor Show may preview the collaboration.

II. Selling Its Soul? Maserati Has Been Doing This for Decades

This is not the first time Maserati has "surrendered its soul"—it's just that this time, the new partner is Chinese. Peel back the technical underpinnings of Maserati's mainstream models over the past two decades, and you'll find a rather embarrassing reality—

2.1 What Lies Beneath the Trident: Mercedes Skeleton + Chrysler Parts + Ferrari Engines

A bloodline chain: Mercedes W220/W211 → Chrysler 300C → Maserati Quattroporte/Ghibli/Levante.

Chinese consumers paying CNY 1 million for an "Italian luxury sports sedan" got front suspension from a 1990s Mercedes S-Class, rear suspension from a Mercedes E-Class, an engine block from Chrysler, and infotainment and HVAC from the 300C—slap on a Trident badge, triple the price.

2.2 The "In-House" Era: Still Ferrari's DNA

After Ferrari announced it would stop supplying engines in 2019, Maserati launched the "in-house" Nettuno V6, heavily promoting its F1 pre-chamber combustion technology—but the foundation is still Alfa Romeo's 690T, which itself is a Ferrari V8 minus two cylinders. So-called "fully independent R&D" is just a detour to keep using Ferrari's DNA.

2.3 Going Further Back: The MC12 Was a Rebadged Enzo

The 2004 MC12, revered as a "Maserati legend"—same Ferrari F140 V12 engine (slightly detuned), same chassis, same gearbox, same wheelbase. 50 road cars that were essentially rebodied Ferrari Enzos.

So Huawei is not the first "invader." Maserati has never been a brand that survives on its own technology—it survives on others' technology + its own styling + the Trident badge. From Ferrari to Mercedes to Chrysler to Huawei, the suppliers change, but the business model doesn't. The only difference is—this time, the supplier is from China.

III. The Abyss: This Time It's Not a New Heart, It's a New Life

The numbers don't lie:

• Global sales plummeted from a 2017 peak of 51,000 to 7,900 in 2025—halved, then halved again
• China market: from 14,498 to roughly 1,000 units, a 93% collapse
• Profit margin: -27.3%—losing EUR 27.3 for every EUR 100 in revenue
• Electrification? A joke: Grecale Folgore slashed from CNY 898,800 to CNY 358,800 to clear inventory, sold only 91 units nationwide, discontinued immediately
• Parent Stellantis lost EUR 22.3 billion in 2025, withdrew electrification investment from Maserati

Ferrari at least only provided engines; Chrysler only provided chassis—Maserati still had tuning, assembly, and product definition as its core competencies. This time? Huawei takes even product definition. Maserati is left with nothing but a skin and a badge. "Desperate survival" doesn't begin to cover it—this is amputation.

IV. Huawei's Calculus: Trading Technology for a "Golden Passport"

Huawei commands a 77% market share in China's intelligent driving segment above CNY 400,000—dominant. But going overseas? The European market has effectively shut Huawei out—the "high-risk supplier" label can't be torn off by product quality alone.

Maserati's shell transforms Huawei's technology into "Italian luxury brand's electrification upgrade." The political narrative shifts instantly from "Chinese tech invasion" to "European brand revival." This is backdoor globalization—saving a decade of effort.

Reference point: After Stellantis invested in Leapmotor, Leapmotor's 2026 European sales surged 726.5% year-on-year, capturing 33.5% of Italy's pure EV market. But Leapmotor plays in the mass-market segment—technology export in the ultra-luxury space is an entirely different proposition.

V. Short-Term: All Four Parties Get What They Need

• Maserati: Full-stack technology jumps from "a generation behind" to "world-class"—at least they're still at the table
• Huawei: Saves a decade of building overseas brand recognition and channels from scratch; the Trident's endorsement beats any ad campaign
• Stellantis: Gets a mature intelligent EV solution for free, compresses R&D cycle from 36 months, leverages Chinese supply chain to cut costs
• JAC Motors: 200,000 units of capacity filled, plus the chance to learn luxury-grade quality control from Maserati

VI. Long-Term: Four Risks That Could Derail Everything

1. Brand Soul Dilution. Maserati contributes only styling and a badge—the core technology is all Huawei's. What's left? The dual-badge strategy is even riskier: when European consumers discover "my Trident is the same car as China's Maextro," can the halo survive? Then again, the fact that a CNY 1M Ghibli is essentially a Chrysler 300C underneath didn't stop it from selling in China for a decade—consumers never bought "pure Italian engineering"; they bought the Trident.

2. Technology Hollowing-Out. Total dependence on Huawei means inevitable R&D atrophy. After Ferrari cut off engine supplies, Maserati struggled for years to develop the Nettuno—which turned out to still carry Ferrari DNA. If Huawei cuts off supply this time, Maserati won't even have the capital to struggle. Deploying Huawei technology in Europe also requires passing the EU's strict data security reviews.

3. Geopolitics. Cars produced in Chinese factories and exported to Europe face a 27.5% anti-subsidy tariff, eating cost advantages alive. Huawei's own "high-risk" label is another ticking bomb. Build and assemble in Europe? Costs explode, the math doesn't work.

4. Cultural Clash. European automakers take six months of multi-layer approvals to change a technical parameter; Huawei and JAC want to iterate weekly. This deep-rooted pace mismatch will eventually cause friction.

VII. Industry Implications: The Transfer of Definition Rights

• Who defines luxury cars? For a century, the competition was horsepower, suspension, mechanical craftsmanship—the definition rights belonged to German and Italian engineers. Now intelligent technology is the core competitive advantage. Maserati's adoption of Huawei technology is tantamount to an admission: the definition rights for luxury cars are shifting from West to China.
• This model is replicable. Audi has already gone first (Q5L/A5L fully equipped with Huawei Qiankun intelligent driving, A5L monthly sales exceeding 8,000). If this works in ultra-luxury, will Ferrari and Aston Martin be far behind?
• Supply chain collective expansion. Behind Huawei are BOE, CATL, Hesai Technology, and thousands of other Chinese suppliers—moving from low-end contract manufacturing to high-end technology export. This is the greatest industrial significance.

Conclusion

Short-term, all four parties can win. If the first model launches in 2027 and achieves 50,000–80,000 annual sales, it will preliminarily validate the model. But long-term success doesn't depend on sales figures—it depends on whether the four parties can find that equilibrium between "backdoor listing" and "nourishing the soul." Maserati cannot be reduced to just a skin; Huawei cannot treat it as merely a conduit. Otherwise, this is a marriage of convenience, not a new paradigm for globalization.

Then again—Maserati has been surviving this way for decades. Ferrari's heart, Enzo's skeleton, Mercedes' suspension, Chrysler's chassis, Alfa Romeo's platform—who really cared? Consumers never bought "pure Italian engineering"; they bought the Trident. As long as Huawei makes the car beneath that Trident fast enough and smart enough, the story can keep going.

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The Asia Economic Research Institute (AERI) is a think tank dedicated to regional economic research and cooperation in Asia. Since its establishment, the Institute has made promoting sustainable Asian economic development and facilitating regional economic integration its core mission, providing intellectual support and decision-making references for governments, enterprises, and international organizations through high-quality economic research, policy analysis, and academic exchange activities.

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